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Abstract: Different starting points, similar processes and different outcomes can be identified when com-
paring East Central Europe and East and South Asia. The two regions face similar global challenges, fol-
low regional patterns of democratization and face crises. In communist times, East Central Europe was 
economically marginalized in the world economy, while some parts of Asia integrated well in the global 
economy under authoritarian rule. Europeanization and a favorable external environment encouraged the 
former communist countries to opt for the Western-style rule of law and democracy. Different external 
factors helped the Third Wave democracies in Asia, especially South Korea and Taiwan, which benefited 
from the support of the United States and other global economic, military and cultural partnerships to 
develop their human rights culture and democracy while facing their totalitarian counterparts, namely the 
People’s Republic of China and North Korea. The very different positions Taiwan and Hungary have in 
their respective regions follow from the different capacities of their transformation management since 
1988–1989. Taiwan preserved its leading role and stable democracy despite the threat to its sovereignty 
from the People’s Republic of China. Hungary never had such an influential and problematic neighbor 
and was ensured security and welfare partnership by the European Union, which Taiwan lacked. While 
Taiwan was less secure, economic and social conditions were more favorable for democratization than 
those in Hungary. Hungary, in turn, held a leading position in democratization processes in the period of 
post-communist transition which was lost during the crisis and conflicts of the last decade (after 2006 and 
especially since 2010). Despite the fact that liberalization prepared the way for peaceful transition in both 
countries and resulted in similar processes of democratic consolidation in the 1990s, Hungary joined the 
‘loser’ group in its region, whereas Taiwan is among the top ‘winning’ countries in its region. Taiwan at the 
moment is starting comprehensive reform processes toward enhanced democracy, civil rights and the rule 
of law, and Hungarian development is criticized by many external and internal analysts as straying from the 
path of European-style consolidated democracies towards illiberal trends and hybridization. Western global 
concepts of democratization may help to identify similarities and differences, and compare stronger and 
weaker factors in the democratic transitions in Asia and Europe within the Third Wave democracies.
Key words: democratization, hybridization, regional development, Central Europe, East Asia, Democ-
racy, party system, political protest, social movements, mobilization, authoritarianism, competitive au-
thoritarianism
Introduction
The paper is based on the results of discussions from global and European political science and international relations, including:
1 This paper was finished in the Institute of Advanced Studies Kőszeg, 2017 April–June. The Tai-
wan field research was carried out at Taipei R.O.C. at the Soochow University, as guest professor of 
Chang-Fo-Chuan Centre for the Study of Human Rights, teaching at the Human Rights MA Program 
2015 February–June, and carrying out research 2016 June–September with the fellowship of the Hun-
garian National Bank Pageo Foundation in Soochow University Taipei the same Centre.
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the “end of transition paradigm” (Carothers, 2002); –
“anti-democracy promotion and democracy promotion/development strategies”  –
(Carothers, 2015; Whitehead, 2014);
“hybridization and new authoritarianism” (Diamond, 2002; Morlino, 2009; Krasztev,  –
Til, 2015; Levitsky-Way, 2010; Babayan, Risse, 2015; Soest, Whitehead, 2015; Au-
thoritarianism, 2015).
Carothers’ (2002) seminal work on the end of the transition paradigm heralded a new 
era of studies on the many kinds of the Third Wave transitions. Literature on illiber-
al tendencies, hybridization and new authoritarianism has resulted in a much-debated 
new approach. A few analysts, such as Ekiert (2011), Miszlivetz (2012), Carothers and 
Brechenmacher (2014), Krasztev, Til (2015), Whitehead (2016), Szabó (2015) – have 
tried to reach a conclusion on the challenge of the crisis for post-authoritarian and post-
communist civil societies.
However, Dahrendorf (1990), in his famous stage model, made it clear that, after the 
emergence of a new civil society, its political culture will mature only after a long and 
conflict-ridden period leading to the establishment of a new constitution, political system 
and market economy. Linz and Stepan (1996) reflected on civil society as a prerequi-
site of democratic consolidation embedded in the framework of democracy, the market 
economy, statehood, and the new rule of law. Democracy in relation to civil society was 
the precondition for democratic stabilization and consolidation, as defined by Wolfgang 
Merkel (1994) and his various research groups. Within literature, after the global civil 
society enthusiasm of the 20th century, a more self-critical and self-reflective approach 
emerged, focusing on the effects of economic and political crises on civic development 
(Berg-Schlosser, 2015; Shin, Kim, 2016), which will be reflected in this project.
Transition literature on South European and South American trends had become elite-
centric. Later, the analysis of East Asian and Eastern European transitions, mainly the lat-
ter, brought civil society to the fore (Arato, 1992). To discuss the democratic progress, it is 
important to differentiate the concepts of liberalization, democratic transition and demo-
cratic consolidation. For Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996), the first indicates a non-
democratic state with a mix of policy and social changes, such as reduced censorship of the 
media and toleration of opposition; the second indicates free competitive elections; and the 
last indicates that democracy has behaviorally, attitudinally and constitutionally become 
‘the only game in town.’ They proposed five necessary arenas as working definitions of 
consolidated democracy: civil society, political society, rule of law, usable bureaucracy, 
and economic society (Linz, Stepan, 1996, pp. 1–11). Consequently, here we will adopt 
the above-mentioned criteria for discussion, for two reasons: (1) their comprehensiveness 
and theoretical coherence (not to clarify all prominent definitions from different view-
points); (2) it is possible to dynamically and strictly assess the progress and regression of 
consolidation, which could not be achieved by negative single-index concepts. For Linz 
and Stepan, civil society refers to self-organizing groups, movements and individuals, rela-
tively autonomous from the state, that attempt to articulate values, create associations, and 
advance their interests. Thus, in this arena, they believed that the primary organizing prin-
ciple would be freedom of association and communication; furthermore, rule of law which 
might establish legal guarantees, would be one of the necessary supporting conditions from 
other arenas (Linz, Stepan, 1996, pp. 7, 14).
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As analysis of the development of civil society in former communist countries has 
shown, a varied social map of new civil societies has emerged (Ekiert, Kubik, 2014; 
Bába, 2016; Ekiert, Foa, 2011, 2017), with Central and Eastern Europe similar to estab-
lished European models, and Russia and post-Soviet Central Asia under new authori-
tarian regimes. In the process of EU accession, the Central and Eastern European and 
Baltic regions made progress towards European and global models. Risks to the democ-
ratization processes were stressed in the transition literature, in contrast to the evolution/
progress-based strict stage models (Schmitter, Schneider, 2014). Issues of hybridization 
have long been discussed, especially related to the multiplicity of forms of political 
participation and political conflict resolution (Morlino, 2009; Levitsky, Way, 2010). For 
a long time, Central and Eastern Europe was seen as a success story compared to other 
regions (Merkel, 2010). However, problems of consolidation and economic and political 
crises produced counter-trends to democratic consolidation in Hungary and, recently, 
elsewhere (Ekiert, 2011). Hybridization and illiberal tendencies endanger pluralism and 
tolerance, core values of the old and new civil societies, and weaken the rule of law, en-
abling government intervention in the autonomy of civil society (Bozóki, 2015).
Central and Eastern Europe: a system transition towards European civil society?
In Poland, the mass movement Solidarity, in Czechoslovakia, the small intellectual 
network Charter 77, in Hungary, different networks of critical intellectuals – all articu-
lated the demands of civil society (Bába, 2016). National autonomy and independence 
as an opportunity for the development of civil society within the individual communist 
countries was limited by Soviet intervention; in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 
1968, and in the Soviet-supported Polish military takeover in Poland in 1981, the Soviet 
Union maintained the forced integration of the former socialist countries.
Crises in the planned economy, centralized one-party rule, and international, East-
West conflicts made autonomous national policies more possible within the Eastern bloc 
in the 1970s and 80s. The general trend in Central and Eastern Europe was the use 
of the political sphere by the communist elite to gain popular support by formulating 
autonomous foreign and domestic policies. There were some experimental openings 
towards civil society in Hungary and Poland (Arato, 1992; Frentzel-Zagórska, 1990) 
but authoritarian patterns were simultaneously reinforced and civil society survived in 
a ‘catacomb’ existence. However, the liberalization processes in Poland and Hungary 
opened up political space for the development of true civil society and political opposi-
tion (Falk, 2003).
The legacy of the past, of pre-communist and anti-communist civil society played 
a role in the new beginning. Social solidarity, Christian and Catholic social and moral 
values, national traditions and democratic aspirations established a strong civil society 
as a mobilizing force in Poland throughout the 1980s (Ekiert, Kubik, 2014). The orga-
nizational and symbolic unity of Solidarity (Ekiert, 1996) could not be preserved in the 
framework of pluralist democracy after 1989. Strong organizational unity even hindered 
the development and differentiation of a multi-party system. Compared with Poland, 
there has been considerable political stability in Hungary since 1956 (Tőkés, 1996). 
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Kádárist policy opened up possibilities for the second economy, and the formation of 
civil society on the level of economy. A much less politicized civil society emerged in 
this way in Hungary than in Poland (Michta, 1997; Miszlivetz, 1999; Renwick, 2014). 
Fragmentation and differentiation of opposition intellectual groups and circles had al-
ready developed before system transformation, and their capacity for political bargaining 
with reformers from the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party were much more formidable 
than in Poland. No huge waves of repression comparable to martial law in Poland, took 
place in Hungary after the 1956 revolution and its aftermath. Thus, no umbrella orga-
nization representing national solidarity was established beyond the temporary unity of 
opposition groups which emerged in order to bargain with the communists at the Round 
Table (Tőkés, 1996).
Civil society developed in Poland and Hungary within the established framework of 
statehood, which enabled the global and international opening up of a network of NGOs 
supported by the government and foreign aid. Czechoslovakia’s historical background 
to the regime change is the normalization process introduced after 1968, with the strong 
backing of the post-Stalinist Soviet leadership (Bába, 2016). All reform communists 
were excluded from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and even Soviet reforms 
of the 1980s were ignored by the communist elite, as in the GDR. Opposition groups de-
veloped in an intellectual subculture against the old system, and strict political-adminis-
trative control forced them to be united. Strong repression and rigidity of the communist 
rulers helped to bring national and democratic issues together in opposition discussions. 
Political solidarity from non-conventional artistic groups and former reform communists 
emerged in the form of Charter 77.
The processes of institutionalization and differentiation are connected in Czechoslo-
vakia (Olson, 1997) with the re-emergence of the issues relating to separation, Czech 
and Slovak nation-building and state-building, and the eventual split. The difference in 
political culture between the more Westernized and industrialized Czech regions, and 
the less developed Slovak regions suffering from socio-economic and ethnic problems, 
as well as the unresolved conflict among factions in the new political elite, led to separa-
tion and the peaceful dissolution of the federation into two sovereign states in 1992. The 
potential for nationalist mobilization is more serious in Slovakia, while the political tra-
ditions and culture of the Czech regions have a more Western-European civic orientation 
(Olson, 1997). Czech civil society has been able to develop without significant political 
interference, while in Slovakia civic groups have been united against the authoritarian 
experimentation with nationalist mobilization and the anti-Western attitude of some po-
litical groupings.
The activities of the US-based international philanthropist George Soros began in 
Hungary in the mid-1980s, as it was then the most open country in the region in which 
to support the development of an open society in a former communist country. Among 
others, the Soros Foundation became an important regional player, and was one of the 
first to bring international aid to Eastern civic initiatives from the material and cultural 
resources of Western civil societies. The Soros network spread throughout the whole re-
gion after 1989, and helped the development of civic engagement with material support, 
by providing training abroad and especially by facilitating networking among Eastern 
civic initiatives, and between Eastern and Western civil societies (Quigley, 1997).
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Protest movements and nation-wide alternative civic organizations emerged as lead-
ing forces in the democratic breakthrough of 1988–1990. The resurrection of civil so-
ciety, self-organizing, bottom-up approaches, new groups of elites and competition be-
tween them, and new organizational forms fast gave shape to the civic sphere, where, 
instead of the former ‘catacomb’ networks, nation-wide mass mobilizations took place 
and reshaped the state and society (Arato, 1992). Civic and political space opened up for 
the umbrella organizations, all-embracing national fronts, thanks to agreements at Round 
Table talks involving civic and political forces to constitute a new political community, 
national institutions and national leaders, renewing the basis of the political community 
(Bába, 2016). The movement organizations and political leadership of the first democ-
ratization period had to be restructured by new political conflicts. As long as the com-
munist party maintained political and administrative control, the new movements were 
connected in a united front. After the dissolution of the monopoly of power, and the 
establishment of new political opportunities, new leaderships and ideologies emerged 
to fill the pluralistic political field, and the formerly united civil society was fragmented 
into various movements and counter-movements.
Throughout the phases of system transformation, socio-political changes took place. 
Social movements mobilized by the crisis and protests set up transitory coalitions with 
temporary organizational consequences. The emergence of a party system is an impor-
tant step in institutionalization (Dawisha, Parrot, 1997). With free elections, the distri-
bution of power and formulation of national policy converge in the setup of new insti-
tutional structures, which represent national interests within pluralistic, conflict-based 
modern societies. Civil society, with its network, is established on the basis of the new 
economy, constitutionalism, the rule of law, and regional and global networks. Associa-
tions, foundations, and different types of NGOs are established. Civic activism develops 
in a progressive way, if it is not hindered by wars, civil wars, ethnic conflicts or resurgent 
authoritarianism.
The processes of system transformation in Central and Eastern Europe had a similar 
dynamic, but with considerable differences. There are some common elements, based 
on common historical and cultural heritage and geographic, economic and social ties to 
Western Europe in this region, especially compared to post-communist development in 
the Balkans and in the former Soviet Union. One of the important distinctive features of 
the transition in Central and Eastern Europe is the absence of violent ethnic and territo-
rial conflicts, unlike those which followed the dissolution of multi-ethnic federal states 
such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Despite the fact that territorially-based ethnic 
minorities do exist, the violent mobilization of the majorities did not occur. Ethnic vio-
lence seems to be under control in this region, where new political institutions, consti-
tutional frameworks and political parties are accepted as channels for the distribution 
of power. The Europeanization process, the dynamics of European integration and its 
effects produced a largely supportive trend for the development of Central and Eastern 
European civil society.
The international, as well global and regional, dimension of democratization process-
es was clear within the revitalization process of civil society. International organizations 
and foreign governments had to become key supporters, as the new capitalists were less 
involved in philanthropy in the new market system. Government support is, on one hand, 
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rare during the transition to a market economy; on the other hand, NGOs do not always 
ask for government support. The scarcity of internal resources is one reason why foreign, 
especially international and Western, aid was and is so important for the new sector of 
NGOs in the new EU member states (Jensen, Miszlivetz, 2006).
The demonstration effect of Western models is also very important in the rebirth of 
NGOs. Pre-communist traditions were broken by communist totalitarianism, and the 
government-led pseudo-autonomous organizations of the communist period did not pro-
vide a sustainable model for the new beginning after 1989. The geographical and cultural 
presence of the Western European, especially German, model of society is characteristic 
of democratization in Hungary, but Anglo-Saxon, especially US-American, material and 
intellectual support has also been influential through the institutions and programs af-
filiated with the US Embassy and the network of the Soros Foundation (Quigley, 1997). 
Internationalization, globalization, and regionalization were especially important for the 
emerging or re-emerging civil movements, characterized by the ‘poor’ situation, scarcity 
of resources, and lack of experience with pluralist conditions. Poor Eastern movements 
were looking for richer Western partners and cooperation, and there were attempts among 
Eastern movements to network beyond national levels and increase the effectiveness of 
their own resources (Schreier, 2015).
Hungarian civil society remained weaker than that in Poland even after the transi-
tion, despite a considerable amount of Western aid. In Hungary, domestic civil soci-
ety never reached a level of strength comparable to that of its counterpart in Poland 
(which included a large independent trade union). By the end of the 1980s, organizations 
which had emerged to fill the void (Danube mobilization, Hungarian Democratic Forum) 
quickly transformed themselves into political parties during the democratization process, 
and this very fact left civil society relatively empty, resulting to some extent in a ‘civil 
vacuum’ in the new Hungarian democracy. Civic organizations and NGOs may not have 
lacked financial backing but they did lack membership, supporters and local networks. 
This weakness can partly explain the low level of civic mobilization in Hungary (com-
pared to Poland) and the weakness of watchdogs during the 1990s.
The general attitude of the new regime was positive, affirmative and helpful towards 
NGOs, and the legal and political situation was often reformed with the aim of improve-
ment. One general difference between NGOs and civil society in stable Western democ-
racies compared to those in post-totalitarian/authoritarian former communist countries 
is the higher level of innovation in the latter group compared to the former, but more 
efficiency and stability in the former group than the latter. Conditions in some Western 
democracies for NGOs are stable, legitimate, and effective in the long run, while condi-
tions in new democracies are in constant flux, and therefore their legitimacy and effec-
tiveness can be weak (Kuti, Sebestyén, 2004).
By joining NATO, the OECD and the EU, Hungary became part of the circle of 
donor states within Europe and the world system. The level of governmental financial 
support is still below the average of the welfare democracies, thus analysts still encour-
age or demand more and more government support in order to finance the functions (in 
culture, welfare, education, etc.) that have been abandoned by government agencies and 
overtaken by NGOs. While the cry for more government support has been one of the 
repetitive echoes of discussions on NGO finances since regime transition, at the same 
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time they demand self-government and autonomy. To find a compromise between these 
two is the task of the schemes developed to finance NGOs in Hungary, based upon inter-
nal resources and encouraging private initiatives. The systems of tax remission and tax 
donation could be seen as a large macro-system of citizen re-education for philanthropy 
and civic engagement. On the other hand, this ‘re-schooling society’ process is based 
upon the changing political opportunity structures, which affects the government policy 
of NGO financing. The present system is a top-down scheme, although the basic idea 
was bottom-up, based upon liberal philosophy.2 Nowadays, NGOs in Hungary act in 
the multi-layered environment of the global, EU, national, and local policy actors, who 
should develop their resource-mobilization strategies in this multi-organizational field 
with different types of stakeholders.
Transition, consolidation and civil society in East Asia
A general starting point for discussion is whether the democratic transitions in Asia 
could at all be interpreted in the same theoretical framework as democratic transitions 
in other parts of the world (Cotton, 1997; Shin, Kim, 2016). In the 1990s, research on 
democratic consolidation was already raising serious questions around East Asian Third 
Wave democracies, using various arguments which mostly still remain relevant today. As 
a counterweight to homogenizing approaches, a regional analysis for limits and achieve-
ments of democratization was proposed, which is still under development. Western-style 
pluralist opposition as an important agent and actor against the authoritarian regime 
was apparently a less marked phenomenon in East Asia than in Southern and Eastern 
Europe. The blooming economy under authoritarian but benevolent regimes (Taiwan, 
South Korea, Singapore) established more openness to the authoritarian past than in 
Eastern Europe or South America.
However, there are many aspects warranting comparison between post-authoritarian 
Asian and Central and Eastern European countries, based upon the following issues:
Struggling with the past; –
Lack of, or weakness of, human rights culture; –
Instability of the constitution and human rights regimes after transition; –
2  The general state of civil society was depicted in 2009, and continues to be relevant today: “De-
spite the high level of social self-organization, there is only a limited opportunity for social participation 
in political-economic decisions. In fact, real civic control, influence and enforcement of interests are 
hardly typical for the sector […]. The gradual devaluation of the civil sphere was caused among other, 
by the lack of citizenry (citoyen), aborted historical development, or [...] the ‘defective protest culture’ 
also contributed to that phenomena just like the lack of trust and solidarity between citizens, citizen’s 
legitimacy deficit against the state or bad regulations (a ‘civil’ organization founded by the state and the 
local government) [...] regardless of the increasing economic power of the civil sector, the status of its 
economic base still cannot be considered stable [...] Hungarian civil society cannot make its voice heard 
in domestic politics and is even incapable of participating on equal terms in political decision making 
with the representatives of the central and local (municipalities) power. […] over the past 20 years the 
Hungarian civil sphere has been unable to create and strengthen such institutions (e.g. social publicity, 
protests) that would ensure society’s self-protection against the abuses of the state (and the parties) and 
that would provide some help battling democracy deficits” (Fodor, Kern, 2009, pp. 189–191).
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Tendency towards economic and financial crises; –
External factors, such as being surrounded by authoritarian or regimes, local conflicts  –
and tensions, migration waves.
This research paper attempts to discuss the different forms of civic engagement and 
partisanship, development of civil society, and sustainability of the achievement of civic 
development. The two regions are far away from each other in space and in terms of cul-
tural tradition, and there are manifold differences, but they are bound by global networks, 
and in this way they are both divided and integrated by the effects of globalization. In 
both regions, Central and Eastern Europe and post-authoritarian East and South East 
Asia, a wide body of literature has been established regarding some focal points which 
are characteristic for each region. In Central and Eastern Europe, the tradition of the 
planned economy, the need to rebuild the market economy after communism, the oppor-
tunities for European networking, extended welfare services and the tradition of interwar 
developments can be identified (Dawisha, Parrot, 1997); and in Asia, integration into the 
world economy, the successes of economic development under authoritarian rule, the 
challenge of the poorly dealt with authoritarian past, civilian-military relations, and the 
relationship between ancient Asian culture and religion and Western-based global human 
rights values and concepts are the main lines of differentiation (Diamond, Plattner, 1998; 
McAllister, 2016; Croissant, 2004).
Shin (2008, 2016), Fukuyama (2012) and others established a network of analytical 
aspects for the interpretation of problems and achievements of new democracies in East 
and South East Asia, relating to the Third Wave and subsequent consolidation:
East Asia is a region where the Third Wave of democratization could not achieve  –
sustainable results, and different tendencies towards illiberal democracies are docu-
mented;
Some of the important authoritarian regimes are located there, especially China,  –
North Korea, and Vietnam (and Russia nearby);
China is traditionally the core state of reference for Asian civilizations; –
Authoritarian-capitalist states as China, Vietnam and especially Singapore maintain  –
an alternative to democracy with high opportunity costs and support authoritarian 
nostalgia for former developmental authoritarian regimes;
There is no regional organization for implementing human rights and democratic  –
values as efficiently as the EU; ASEAN has a much weaker profile;
Benevolent authoritarian dictatorships have a long tradition in the region, from an- –
cient to modern times;
Economic success, wellbeing and development is associated with the current authori- –
tarian regime (‘China-factor,’ Singapore as a success story);
Traditional value systems; ‘Asian values’ of Confucianism have a contemporary in- –
fluence which is different than Western-style human rights and democracy;
Civil society is much less developed and younger than the authoritarian-bureaucratic  –
state; political culture has a hybrid character within the region, involving authoritar-
ian, anti-liberal and democratic and liberal elements;
There is no general, regional consensus on the ‘rules of the game,’ unlike in the EU; –
The persistence of the idea of benevolent authoritarian rulers, and the need for ‘strong  –
men’ as top leaders;
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Less tolerance than in pluralist US- or European-based systems towards press free- –
dom;
Weak roots of party systems, which need more experience of periodic elections than  –
the ‘double test’ of Huntington; two peaceful changes of the governmental power;
Weak civil society, combined with a new type of political mobilization in the new  –
civic culture, living together with deeply rooted traditional forms of legitimacy;
A narrow, Schumpeterian concept of electoral democracy, spread out and stabilized  –
as a starting point for further democratization.
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are countries where liberal democracy has proved to 
be stable in the long term, but only with the help of majoritarian electoral systems, hege-
monic or two-party systems, and strong ideas of an enemy among the authoritarian states 
(e.g. China, North Korea), or some combination of these elements. Here, development 
of a middle class, the mobilization of civil society and value changes in favor of the rule 
of law and democracy have helped to consolidate democratic regimes, albeit not without 
serious problems. In other cases, cycles of crises have annulled or hybridized democratic 
regimes, as in the case of the Philippines or Thailand (Croissant, 2004).
All of these trends and patterns are not far removed from those observed in Eastern 
Europe in the 1990s. The emerging new political culture was lacking the values and experi-
ence of tolerance, multi-party systems were still under development, and traditional values 
– of course, different than those found in Asia – became influential once more after the fall 
of communism. The rejection of the old regime was more radical, as well as the discon-
tinuity inherent in the transition away from the communist planned economy and system 
of scarcity. Meanwhile, urbanization, modernization, and even globalization characterized 
the fast-growing and innovative economies of the authoritarian developing dictatorships of 
Taiwan, South Korea or Singapore. In this way, Southern Europe was more similar to East 
Asia, in that no radical change of property or economic system occurred there alongside 
democratization, at least not in such a radical way as in the former communist countries.3
Thinking back to Central and Eastern Europe at the time of the transition, more opti-
mistic predictions for that region were based very much on the external framework, the 
prospect of EU accession and Western aid, as well as hopes for the newly emerging mar-
ket economies. EU accession and the process of Europeanization helped to build a con-
sensus among the different factions of the political elite, and Europeanization seemed to 
have great potential to influence the new democracies and market economies of Eastern 
Europe, despite the conflicts which emerged from the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. 
However, the common denominator for the new South and East Asian democracies was 
less clear, and the development of ASEAN never provided a similar dynamic to the 
Europeanization process at that time. On the global scene, China was an emerging ac-
tor, and the US supported democratization and consolidation processes in the region, 
not with the same intensity and engagement in each and every country, but according to 
the regional interests of their foreign policy. Democratic consolidation in Japan, Taiwan 
3 The prospects for consolidation were rather moderate, as stated: “In short, where democratic 
consolidation has been proceeding, it has not always established the conditions that are fundamental for 
the reproduction for a Western-style democracy. Finally, the present era [end of the 90s – M.Sz.] may 
not be as favorable to democratization as the latter part of the 1980s was. In particular, the imperatives 
of globalization may reduce the attractiveness of democracy” (Cotton, 1997, p. 116).
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and South Korea, which are considered to be stable, free and liberal democracies in the 
region, is partly due to the US presence and support based on security concerns in these 
countries, with powerful enemies on the other side (Diamond, 1997; Shin, Kim, 2016; 
McAllister, 2016; Croissant, 2017).
The Third Wave produced a ‘muddling through’ of unconsolidated systems, and the 
emergence of a ‘reverse wave’ against democratization can be documented and observed 
in the region. According to Larry Diamond (1997, 1998, 2014), the role and importance 
of external factors and their interplay with internal factors was the key to consolidation 
in Taiwan and South Korea. Their role within the global economy, internal economic 
and technological development and the effect of this on the social structure produced 
a unique Westernization, combined with their role in the Asian security and general pol-
icy of the US, i.e. their geopolitical situation.4
Discussions surrounding consolidation have emphasized the wide range of democ-
racy promotion activities (Carothers, 2015) in the form of various resources that Eastern 
Europe enjoyed, e.g. being targeted by the developed democracies from Western Europe 
and elsewhere. This kind of help reached the East and South Asian countries in the 
form of new or long-established cultural and educational exchange, mainly from the 
US/Canada/Australia, and to a lesser extent from Western Europe. Strengthening party 
systems, civil societies, public media discourse, and the inclusion of passive citizens 
in political mobilization posed similar challenges to Eastern Europe, but the different 
structures of the pre-democratic authoritarian regimes demanded different strategies and 
concepts of democratic aid. Moreover, global structures, such as the UN global human 
rights regime, which was established or re-established after the Cold War, made similar 
challenges relating to the rule of law, legal culture and institutional reform of the two 
regions. The introduction of new institutions and the growth of a new culture of human 
rights presupposed civic activism by human rights initiatives, which had been develop-
ing since the transition in both regions. However, civic activism has a different profile 
in the two regions. Asian values of collectivism, the importance of the public good, 
deference to authority, and communitarianism are missing in Eastern Europe, where the 
4 “With the reunification of Germany, these two democracies [Taiwan and South Korea – M.S.] 
are now unique in their status as divided countries, facing threats to their very existence from com-
munist regimes of the same nationality that claim sovereignty over them. […] The resulting threats to 
the national security of the two democracies have slowed efforts to democratize civil-military relations 
and to dismantle the vestiges of authoritarian national – security laws and structures. At the same time, 
the quest for international legitimacy and Western (especially U.S.) support have driven forward the 
processes of democratization in many other respects […] The dilemma is particularly acute for Taiwan, 
given mainland China’s economic dynamism and substantially greater size and power. Yet precisely 
because Taiwan is so threatened – and by one of the world’s most authoritarian states – democracy 
has become a resource and a legitimating symbol in its quest for an accepted place in world affairs” 
(Diamond, 1997: XXXIV–XXXV). “The export dependence of Korea and Taiwan has pushed political 
development in a democratic direction. Closer economic and political integration with the advanced 
industrial democracies […] will become virtually impossible if these two countries cannot implement 
and maintain democratic systems. At the same time, however, middle classes aware of the need for so-
cioeconomic stability to maintain international competitiveness have not been sympathetic to militant 
mobilization by labor and other organized groups. Thus the high degree of involvement in the world 
economy also generates a bias for stability and moderation that tends to limit the potential for polarizing 
conflict over socioeconomic issues” (Diamond, 1997: XXXV).
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pseudo-collectivism of communism gave rise to individualism, lack of trust in institu-
tions and communities and neglecting the public good (Hankiss, 1990).
Philippe C. Schmitter (1997) made a clear-cut and systematic differentiation between 
civil society in the East and West. He stressed that the diffusion of Western civil society 
reached Asia by way of colonization, cultural globalization and economic ties, as well as 
migration (Chinese, Korean, Taiwanese, etc. communities in the US, Australia, Europe). 
He mentioned the possibility of initiating and implementing the role of civic associations 
in the development of rule of law procedures, and legal and administrative reforms after 
the transition (such as bar associations, alumni associations, etc.) drawing from Western 
and global rule of law cultures. Based upon his own earlier research on neo-corporatism, 
Schmitter characterized civic associations employing Asian values as intermediaries be-
tween the state and society at the level of local, regional and professional organizations 
and self-regulation. In his view, in Asia, the Hegelian-German-European polarization 
and clear divide between state and civil society is less pronounced, and even Hegel in 
his Philosophy of Law categorized corporate associations as mediators between state 
and society. Following the French 19th century Liberal thinker, Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Schmitter argues that the authoritarian regimes in Asia built such strong connections 
between state and society in the liberalization phase that these mechanisms were able to 
survive during the latter phases of democratic consolidation.
This organized, embedded transformation, as in the case of Taiwan, enabled a non-vi-
olent and less conflictual regime change, although the inherited informal mechanisms of 
the previous regime may prove hindrances and obstacles to legal change in the direction 
of a Western-style human rights regime in the long run. This point makes the Taiwan-
Hungary comparison of system transition later in this study particularly pertinent. The 
reform-oriented elite factions played an important role in the two transitions, despite the 
remarkable differences between Taiwan and Hungary in many respects.
The unique case of Taiwan (Chu, 1998; McAllister, 2016), where the state was based on 
the Kuonmintang army and administration coming from the mainland China after defeat 
by the communists, produced a militarized, Leninist-style regime in Taiwan, which copied/
reproduced certain characteristics of the Russian and Chinese party-state (Cheng, Haggard, 
1992). Instead of conflict between state and civil society, both the state and civil soci-
ety were organized based on the top-down military and political network of the mainland 
Chinese elite. This elite penetrated the civilian population, military, state and society and 
suppressed the local Taiwanese elites for a long time, forcing them to build up a counter-
elite against the state and military. The strong interconnectedness of state-Kuomintang 
party-army established the conflict between civil society and the military regime. This was 
also present in other Asian post-war authoritarian/developmental regimes, but in the case 
of Taiwan it was strengthened by the conflict between the KMT and PRC, as well as with 
local Taiwanese groups (Wu, Wen, 1992). This division was established during the liberal-
ization and democratization processes as the main axis of conflict, i.e. the split between the 
major parties, the Kuomintang party versus the Taiwan-based pro-independence Demo-
cratic Progressive Party, which has been the mainstay of party competition since 1986. 
Political parties emerged from both factions, but the two camps, the Blue (the KMT, who 
came from mainland China and hope for some kind of reintegration with the mainland) and 
the Green (the DPP, focused on Taiwanese cultural and political independence and recruit-
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ed from groups who have been based in Taiwan longer), still form the main dividing line 
in the political and social system. Such a marked division, going back to the political and 
social realm of the former authoritarian system, is mirrored in Eastern Europe in the divide 
between the former nomenclature and non-elite groups and religiosity vs. secularization as 
the main points of differentiation between the political left and right, as in case of Hungary 
(Körösényi et al., 2009). However, this is not bound so strongly to (sub)ethnic, language 
and local identities as in Taiwan. Civil and political development in Taiwan would have to 
leave this pre-democratic pattern behind to unite a nation, a real macro-political communi-
ty identity, instead of the ‘separatist’ identity of an island (McAllister, 2016). However, the 
strong external challenge from the People’s Republic of China, among other factors, has 
formed the dual party system of Taiwan, based upon the issue of separation vs. integration. 
After the democratic transition, the Kuomintang became the party of understanding and 
dialogue with China, and the DPP (Lu, 1992) became associated with setting boundaries 
and demanding guarantees to avoid a too strong and rapid integration with the mainland, 
which could endanger the results of the democratic transition and consolidation, as well as 
Taiwanese independence (Bush, 2014). Both parties frame the ‘China factor’ differently, 
and analyze and perceive the experience of the Chinese principle of ‘one country – two 
systems’ in Hong-Kong and Macau according to their own world view (Ortmann, 2010, 
2015; Ngok, 2008).
Statehood as one of the important five realms of democratic consolidation, accord-
ing to the concept of consolidation developed by Linz & Stepan (1996), is not a fully 
developed institution in the case of Taiwan due to its lack of sovereignty. State power, in 
the sense of monopoly of control over the territory, exists, but sovereignty is contested 
by China and therefore is not acknowledged by the majority of states and international 
organizations. China implements the ‘one China principle’ in a very consequential way 
in bilateral and multilateral relations, due to its growing economic, military and interna-
tional position of power. The sovereignty of Taiwan is accepted only by a small circle of 
diplomatic allies (Chu, Moon, 1997). The vast majority of states and international orga-
nizations, including the UN, do not accept Taiwanese statehood, unless with the consent/
support of PRC and according to its rules, as the ‘Chinese Taipei.’
Aurel Croissant (2004), as well as other scholars of the region such as McAllister 
(2016), consider that Taiwan, alongside South Korea and Mongolia, is one of the best ex-
amples of democracy among the Third Wave transition countries in Asia. In his view, the 
South East Asian new democracies are under constant threat of crisis and internal prob-
lems, which is not conducive to the consolidation of democracy. However, he and other 
analysts have identified problems of freedom of expression, rule of law and horizontal 
accountability, as well as serious corruption problems, even in these well-performing 
political systems (Garner, 2011).
Another recent analysis by Larry Diamond and co-authors (2014) stresses that, in 
Taiwan and South Korea, we are dealing with maturing democracies, which are compa-
rable to the established new democracies in Europe and South America, but, due to the 
challenges to their statehood/sovereignty, nation-building issues, and policies towards 
China and North Korea, as well as internal defects in their constitutions, rule of law 
and polarized party system, they are vulnerable to political crises. The recent politi-
cal crisis in 2016/17 in South Korea involving the presidency, informal influence, cor-
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ruption networks and parallel challenges from the aggressive military policy of North 
Korea underlined this problem, and made the internal and external problems of South 
Korean democracy very visible (Diamond, Shin, 2014). The success of demonstrations 
and rallies against the president in South Korea resulted in the ruling of parliament and 
Constitutional Court against the corrupt president, and criminal proceedings against for-
mer President Pak began, which serves as proof of the strength of civil society and the 
constitutional order against anti-democratic tendencies.
Concluding this chapter, we may state that Western global concepts of democratiza-
tion may help to identify similarities and differences, and compare stronger and weaker 
factors within democratic transitions in Asian and Central and Eastern European Third 
Wave democracies. Different starting points, similar processes and different outcomes 
can be identified comparing Central and Eastern Europe and South and East Asia. Facing 
similar global challenges, some regional patterns of democratization and resulting crises 
are developing. Central and Eastern Europe was economically marginalized during com-
munist times, whereas some parts of Asia were well integrated into the global economy 
under authoritarian rule. Europeanization and a favorable external environment helped 
former communist countries to become oriented towards Western-style rule of law and 
democracy, and external factors helped Third Wave democracies in Asia, especially 
South Korea and Taiwan, aided by US and other global economic, military and cultural 
partnerships, to develop their human rights culture and democracy in the face of their 
totalitarian counterparts in the Peoples Republic of China and North Korea. This strong 
conflict was, on the one hand, a reason for the strength of the military and security power 
in these countries, and on the other hand the external threat strengthened the need to 
draw dividing lines with the enemy, which helped to establish strong human rights and 
democratic engagement, combined with a pro-development state supporting world mar-
ket integration. The democratic development of these two countries is based upon the 
outward challenge from autocratic regimes and political-military support of democratic 
regimes such as the US. These developments helped to establish the polarized party sys-
tems and political cultures based upon the division of the Chinese and Korean nations.
The tendency towards hybridization among new democracies is globally evident, and 
consolidation after transition is endangered by the resurgence of populism, nationalism and 
new authoritarianism. Concepts of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky, Way, 2010) and 
of hybrid regimes (Diamond, 2002; Morlino, 2009) help to analyze the different outcomes 
of democratic transitions. The challenge of hybridization is present in both East Asia and 
Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary and Taiwan will be compared as two diverging, 
but in many respects similar, cases of a state with an authoritarian tradition, followed by 
a democratic transition and various waves of consolidation and de-consolidation.
Some of the general trends of changes in the former underground clandestine 
protest movements in the new democracies of Hungary and Taiwan
In 1989–1990, the transitions in Taiwan and Hungary had similar characteristics; 
a peaceful change, rather top-down in nature, withdrawal of the authoritarian system and 
the organs of repression (army, police, secret service). However, in 1990, in Hungary the 
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new parties emerging from the opposition movements gained power, whereas the first 
change from the reformed KMT, Kuomintang to the former underground Danwai- a way 
similar to Solidarity in Poland- movement party, the Democratic Progressive Party, took 
place in 2000. There are several reasons why this occurred; in Taiwan, the economic 
system did not have to be changed, and political power remained with the old ruling 
elite, while in Hungary, huge economic and social changes led to a change of elites in 
elections – there were two kinds of transition.
This democratization made possible a long but consequential struggle with the au-
thoritarian past, which led to protest events and the mobilization of social movements 
after transition in both countries. The main protest events have been demonstrations, 
memorial meetings, marches related to the former anti-authoritarian struggles or/and for 
the goals of democratization and national independence in both cases, especially large 
demonstrations in the capital, or other major cities.5 Similar dynamics of protest waves 
can be observed in both cases. Protests tend to be focused on single issues, mainly peace-
ful, taking the form of demonstrations and strikes, with some conflict centered around 
civil disobedience and non-conventional action.
The present ruling parties, Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan, and Fidesz (Alliance 
of the Young Democrats) in Hungary, both of which emerged from the anti-authoritarian, 
former opposition-dissent movements before transition, have become major parties and im-
portant political actors after transition. They have had to change and be challenged by vari-
ous new civic protest movements such as Sunflower, Wild Strawberries, and White Shirts in 
Taiwan, as well as students, environmentalists, or right-and left-wing radicals in Hungary.
In Hungary after the 2010 elections resulted in the Fidesz led hegemonic party system 
and divided opposition, new extra-parliamentary democratic movements have emerged. 
These new movements have tried to mobilize active citizens and have worked to build 
a new political landscape from the bottom up, from civil society. Their mobilization has 
been directed primarily against the policies of the hegemonic party Fidesz. These new 
democratic movements are members of, and supported by, international and especially 
European civic and human rights networks, and are highly Europeanized and globally-
oriented. There is civic, political and media pluralism in Hungary, however restricted, as 
in many other recent competitive-authoritarian or hybrid regimes (Levitsky, Way, 2010; 
Whitehead, 2016). Peaceful forms of protest can be exercised within the framework of 
the assembly/demonstration law of 1989/2018, and there are even political and media 
‘spaces’ for civil disobedience. Not only do the ruling majority and its affiliated organi-
zations have a voice in public, but also the old and new protesters. There exists a limited, 
selective pluralism for protest movements (Jensen, 2015; Szabó, 2015).
In Taiwan, since the system transition, the two main political alternatives have been 
Chiang Kai-shek’s former party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and the party formed from the 
5 The research on social movements and protest in Taiwan is based upon on the long term research 
of Ho and of Hsiao; see Ho (2005, 2014, 2015) Hsiao (1992, 2006). They continue their Taiwan based 
but Asian comparative research projects involving many Taiwanese and Asian scholars. On Hungary 
and Poland in East-Central European perspective Ekiert (1996, 2011), Ekiert, Kubik (1998, 2014), 
as well as Ekiert, Foa (2011, 2017), Miszlivetz (1999), and Jensen (2015), Jensen, Miszlivetz (2006, 
2015), works are there as well as the collective volume of Krastev and Til (2015) on Hungary in English 
and of works of mine Szabó (1996, 2000, 2015).
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opposition movements in 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Elections and 
important government actions and decisions by the DPP presidencies elected in 2000 and 
2004 were followed by intra- and extra-parliamentary protest by the KMT. Mobilization 
of supporters against the democratically elected president and parliament/government 
were included into the political culture of the new democracy in Taiwan. Moreover, the 
KMT have built strong ties with PRC and the Chinese Communist Party, and in this way 
their protests developed a pro-unification, pro-China character. This is an important issue 
in Taiwan, where the Kuomintang established Republic of China is seen by the mainland 
“Communist” Chinese elite, and also many Taiwan’s citizens, as an illegal separation 
from the ancient Chinese state. The DPP stands for Taiwanese independence, and after 
loosing presidential and governmental power in 2008, they supported pro-independence 
civic movements against the newly re-established KMT government. The DPP in oppo-
sition renewed its networks within civil society, which started protest campaigns against 
the policy failures of the KMT government and president.
The biggest mobilizations successfully campaigned against the lack of human rights for 
people in military service and the KMT cross strait policy. The KMT government lost its 
support partly because of the protests and critical discourses on illiberal tendencies within 
civil and political society. The ‘China-factor,’ the specific relationship between the KMT 
and Chinese Communist Party created a ‘shadow of China’ on the liberal democracy of 
Taiwan. The electorate at the 2015 municipal/local and the 2016 presidential/parliamentary 
elections voted with a two-thirds majority for the DPP, and demanded a clear transition to-
wards more independence and autonomy for Taiwan, as well as restoring human rights cul-
ture. As well as the victory of DPP, the party of the Sunflower movement, the New People’s 
Party also gained a few seats in the 2016 parliamentary elections. They have tried to bring 
into public discourse the radical demands of social movements and civic groups. The in 
2016 elected DPP government and president aimed to be agents of reform within Taiwan-
ese politics, breaking long-standing deadlocks, such as inquiries into the violence of the au-
thoritarian regime before 1989, reaching a consensus with the colonized aboriginal tribes, 
reforming the penal system and strengthening human rights and the rule of law. However 
the independency policy and the distance to China resulted in sever economic losses and 
the austerity policy provoked huge protests 2016–18 against the DPP government. Civil 
society activists were disillusioned by the slow and moderate reforms of the rule of law. 
Both opponents and former supporters alienated from the DPP regime, and wide range of 
population felt to be worsening its quality of life and economic situation compared to the 
former KMT regime. The 2018 November local elections produced a landslide victory of 
the opposition party KMT, huge losses of the DPP in local governments and Prime Minis-
ter offered his resignation as well the president gave up the parallel position being the same 
time DPP party president after the 2018 local elections.
Conclusions
The party system in Taiwan and in Hungary is focused on a central conflict; between 
the nationalist-illiberal parties of the right and Europe-oriented, liberally-minded left 
in Hungary, and between the pro-China/nationalist KMT (the Green) and the pro-inde-
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pendence, liberal DPP (the Blue) and their allies in Taiwan. These very strong central 
conflicts have mobilized protest movements led by both parties in both countries, in 
Hungary as well as in Taiwan. Protest campaigns have contributed to two-thirds major-
ity victories in the next elections for the protesting parties, of Fidesz (2010) in Hungary 
and of the DPP (2016) in Taiwan. Both parties have tried to use their dominant position 
at the legislation and the government as well as in the presidency to guarantee their own 
political future within a bipartisan system, accusing the former governing party of cor-
ruption and abuse of power, the KMT in Taiwan and the Socialist and the Liberal par-
ties in Hungary. This fight against the former government parties produced elements of 
competitive authoritarianism and an uneven playing field for the two main competitors, 
the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) in Hungary and the KMT in Taiwan. The ten-
dency towards hybridization is very clear in both cases, but especially in Hungary where 
Fidesz received two-third majority three times on national elections (2010, 2014, 2018) 
this seems to be a long-term trend in Hungary (Magyar, 2016), but it is not a present 
danger in the case of Taiwan, where on the 2018 November local elections the opposi-
tion party KMT received huge support and the much less supported DPP government 
and presidency is in crisis in the aftermath of this election. Both parties, Fidesz and the 
DPP, understand their political success, the two-thirds majorities that they received, as 
a mandate to finish the democratization processes, which they consider incomplete, in 
their own way, securing their own continued dominance, and oppressing the former rul-
ing parties with authoritarian past.
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Regionalny rozwój demokratyzacji i społeczeństwa obywatelskiego: transformacja,  
konsolidacja, hybrydyzacja, globalizacja – Tajwan i Węgry 
 
Streszczenie
Porównanie Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej z Azją Południową pozwala określić ich punkty startu 
obu regionów, podobne procesy i zróżnicowane wyniki. Oba regiony borykają się z podobnymi global-
nymi wyzwaniami, realizują regionalne wzorce demokratyzacji i stają w obliczu kryzysów. W czasach 
komunistycznych Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia była ekonomicznie marginalizowana w gospodarce 
światowej, podczas gdy niektóre znajdujące się pod rządami autorytarnymi regiony Azji dobrze zin-
tegrowały się z gospodarką globalną. Europeizacja i sprzyjające otoczenie zewnętrzne zachęciły byłe 
kraje komunistyczne do wyboru rządów prawa i demokracji typu zachodniego. Inne czynniki zewnętrz-
ne pomogły demokracji „trzeciej fali” w Azji, zwłaszcza w Korei Południowej i na Tajwanie, które sko-
rzystały ze wsparcia ze strony Stanów Zjednoczonych i innych globalnych partnerstw gospodarczych, 
wojskowych i kulturalnych, pozwalających im rozwinąć swoją kulturę praw człowieka i demokrację, 
stojąc twarzą w twarz z totalitarnymi odpowiednikami – Chińską Republiką Ludową i Koreą Północ-
ną. Odmienne pozycje Tajwanu i Węgier w ich regionach wynikają z różnych zdolności zarządzania 
transformacją w latach 1988–89. Tajwan zdołał zachować swoją wiodącą rolę i utrzymać stabilną de-
mokrację, pomimo zagrożenia suwerenności ze strony Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej. Węgry nigdy nie 
miały tak wpływowego i problematycznego sąsiada, a gwarantem ich bezpieczeństwa i partnerstwa 
w drodze do dobrobytu była Unia Europejska – czynnik nieobecny w Tajwanie. Podczas gdy poziom 
bezpieczeństwa na Tajwanie był niższy, panujące tam warunki ekonomiczne i społeczne były bardziej 
korzystne dla demokratyzacji niż na Węgrzech. Węgry z kolei miały wiodącą pozycję w procesach de-
mokratyzacji w czasach postkomunistycznej transformacji, którą utraciły w czasie kryzysu i konfliktów 
w ostatniej dekadzie (po 2006 r., a zwłaszcza od 2010 r.). Mimo że liberalizacja przygotowała grunt 
pod pokojowe przemiany w obu krajach i doprowadziła do podobnych procesów demokratycznej kon-
solidacji w latach 90. dwudziestego wieku, Węgry dołączyły do  grupy przegranych w swoim regionie, 
podczas gdy Tajwan jest jednym z głównych liderów w swoim regionie. Tajwan w chwili obecnej roz-
poczyna kompleksowe reformy zmierzające do wzmocnienia demokracji, praw obywatelskich i prawo-
rządności, a węgierski rozwój jest krytykowany przez wielu zewnętrznych i wewnętrznych analityków 
jako odejście od ścieżki demokracji skonsolidowanych typu europejskiego w kierunku nieliberalnych 
trendów i hybrydyzacji. Zachodnie globalne koncepcje demokratyzacji mogą pomóc zidentyfikować 
podobieństwa i różnice oraz porównać mocniejsze i słabsze czynniki przemian demokratycznych 
w Azji i Europie w ramach demokracji trzeciej fali.
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nia, demokracja, system partyjny, protest polityczny, ruchy społeczne, mobilizacja, autorytaryzm, au-
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